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WHEN SMOKE GETS IN YOUR EYES: 
PROPOSED RATIFICATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE 
GENEVA PROTOCOL ON CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL , 
WARFARE 
In  May, 1974, the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and 
Scientific Developments of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
House of Representatives opened hearings on the chemical and bio- 
logical warfare policy of the United States. The future direction of 
this policy has been a matter of considerable national and international 
attention since November, 1969, when President Nixon announced 
the unilateral renunciation by the United States of the production 
and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins, and the intention of 
the United States to ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Pro- 
hibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, 
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Although Mr. Nixon's 
announcement was seen as a major breakthrough for chemical-bio- 
logical disarmament, its promise has not yet been fulfilled. When in 
August, 1970, the President submitted the Geneva Protocol to the 
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, he did so with the 
"understanding" that the prohibition of the Protocol did not extend 
to tear gases and herbicides which at that time were being used ex- 
tensively by United States forces in Vietnam. The Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, after holding lengthy hearings on the Geneva 
Protocol and the military and political significance of the use of tear 
gas and herbicides, disagreed with this interpretation. In April, 1972, 
Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
mote to the President asking him to reconsider the desirability of 
an "understanding" with respect to tear gas and herbicides, and re- 
quested that several studies on the use of these chemicals in Vietnam 
be made available to the Committee. To  date no substantive response 
has been received from the Administration, and the issue appears 
stalemated. 
In  the meantime, other developments at home and abroad have 
made imperative the swift resolution of this conflict in interpretation. 
On April 10, 1972, a Convention for the Prohibition of Development, 
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Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons 
was concluded under which all signatory nations agreed not to de- 
velop, produce, stockpile or retain biological weapons, and to destroy 
within nine months of accession any existing stocks; on August 10, 
1972, the Convention was submitted to the Senate. Since the United 
States is one of the depository nations, its ratification is necessary for 
the Convention to enter into effect; but as yet the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee has not taken any action. This is apparently 
because of its disagreement with the Administration over the inter- 
pretation of the scope of the Geneva Protocol's chemical warfare 
prohibition. 
Important talks on chemical disarmament are also currently 
underway in Geneva at the United Nations Conference of the Com- 
mittee on Disarmament (hereinafter referred to as CCD). The ne- 
gotiations there are stalled primarily because of disagreement between 
the United States and the Soviet Union over proposed methods of 
disarmament verification and the question of which chemicals should 
be considered ~veap0ns.l One commentator has suggested that there 
is such pessimism about the sincerity of the United States' commitment 
to disarmament that "if an agreement imposing meaningiul restrictions 
in the area of chemical warfare is not soon achieved the existence of the 
organization will be threatened.02 Part of this distrust of the United 
- 
States' intentions is the result of a recent Department of Defense 
- 
announcement that it is seeking funds for the production of binary 
chemical weapons-weapons composed of two nonlethal gases which 
combine in flight to produce a lethal nerve gas. The feeling on the 
part of many nations is that while an intensive review by the Admin- 
istration of the United States' chemical warfare policy is now underway, 
with one possible option presumably being the complete phasing out 
of all the United States' chemical warfare capability, the decision to 
add to an already large stockpiie of chemical weapons cannot be taken 
as a sign of any serious commitment to disarmament. The position of 
the Pentagon that it should push ahead with production of the binaries, 
even though the review of the United States' chemical warfare policy 
1. Hearing on United States Chemical Warfare Policy Before the Subcomm. oir 
National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of  the House Comm, on Foreign 
Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1974) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. 
2. Id. at 19. 
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is expected to be completed within a few months, is considered par- 
ticularly disheartening. 
Finally, on April 30, 1974, Japan put fonvard a new proposal at 
the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for a phased pro- 
gram of disarmament. The suggested plan involves "link[ing] a par- 
ticular type of prohibition, such as prohibiting production of lethal 
agents only, or agreeing on abolishing stockpiles, to separate verifica- 
tion agreements . . . [since] the problems of verification differ, de- 
pending on what is being limited or banned."3 It proposes that 
organophosphorous nerve gases be the first chemical weapons banned 
because they are the most lethal; and then that steps toward complete 
disarmament be taken as agreement on effective verification measures 
can be rea~hed .~  During the May, 1974 hearings of the Subcom- 
mittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Japanese proposal was 
mentioned repeatedly, and it appears that the Administration is giving 
serious attention to it. 
In light of the Japanese proposal, the current disarmament talks, 
the Administration's review of the United States' chemical warfare 
policy, the Defense Department's request for appropriations for pro- 
duction of binary weapons, and the as yet unratified Convention on 
Bacteriological Weapons and Toxins, it seems more important than 
ever for the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification 
of the Geneva Protocol. Since the dispute between the Administration 
and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is over the interpretation 
of the scope of the Protocol's chemical warfare prohibition, it seems 
particularly appropriate at this time to determine whether or not the 
use of tear gas in war is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol. This 
is the focus of the Comment that follows. 
The Geneva Protocol was drawn up against the backdrdp of 
world revulsion to the use of chemical warfare in  World War I. It 
was drafted at the Conference for the Supervision of the International 
Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War (con- 
3. Id. at 197. 
4. Id.  at 198. 
161 
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vened to consider the possible limitation of the international arms 
trade), and was offered as a separate protocol. The United States 
was the initial proponent of the Protocol, but because of Secretary 
of State Kellogg's failure to enlist the participation oE key senators in 
the Geneva negotiations, and the active opposition to ratification of 
the American Chemical Society and the United States Chemical 
Warfare Service, the Senate refused to give its advice and consent to 
ratification. The Protocol provides in relevant part: 
Whereas, the use in war of asphysiating, poisonous or other gases, 
and of all analagous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly 
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world; 
Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in 
Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the World are Parties; 
and 
To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted 
as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and 
the practices of nations; 
DECLARE : 
That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not 
already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this 
prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of 
bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound 
as between themselves according to the terms of this dec- 
l a ra t i~n .~  
There has been considerable controversy over whether tear gas 
is included within the scope of the gas warfare prohibition. In clarify- 
ing an ambiguous treaty provision it is necessary to look at its terms 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning which would be given the 
words in their context and in light of the treaty's pu rp~se .~  Subsequent 
agreements of the parties to the treaty as to its interpretation, and sub- 
sequent practice which indicates the parties' attitude toward its inter- 
pretation are also to be ~onsidered.~ If there is still ambiguity as to 
meaning, one may look at the travaux preparatoires and the circum- 
stances of the treaty's con~lusion.~ T o  satisfy this inquiry, the following 
may be examined: the treaties preceding the Geneva Protocol which 
5. 94 L.N.T.S. 65, 69 (1929), opened for signature June 17, 1925. 
6. Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, 7 1, opened for signature May 23, 
1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969). 
7 .  Id.  7 3(a), ( b ) .  
8. Id. art. 32. 
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shed light on the meaning of the language used in the Protocol-the 
Treaty of Washington of 1922 and the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, 
the negotiating history of the Protocol itself, and the subsequent con- 
duct of the parties to the treaty which indicates a definite interpre- 
tation of the Protocol. There are two caveats which must be borne in 
mind throughout the forthcoming analysis. The first is that ."the 
Geneva Protocol is not a tax statute or a deed for the transfer of land," 
and the narrow approach to interpretation which would be appropriate 
for that type of legal document is not appropriate for a treaty in which 
the signers" intent plays a very large role.g Second, one must at all times 
distinguish the evidence which is relevant to the interpretation of the 
Geneva Protocol itself and that evidence which is determinative of 
the customary international law prohibition of gas warfare. "If one is 
guided by this principle in analyzing the chemical warfare prohibitions 
of the Geneva Protocol, many of the doubts regarding its intended 
scope disappear." lo 
A. Treaty of Versailles 
Primarily because of Senate objections to the provisions for the 
League of Nations contained therein, the United States did not become 
a party to the Treaty of Versailles. However, the United States did 
participate in the negotiations leading up to the Treaty which included 
a ban on chemical warfare. Article 171 of the Versailles Treaty stated 
that "the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all an- 
alagous liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufac- 
ture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany."ll The 
question of whether tear gas is included within the scope of this pro- 
hibition is raised by the discrepancy between the French and English 
texts, since the French text uses the word "similaire~" in place of 
"other." Proponents (notably the United States government) l2 of 
the view that this difference is significant have suggested that the 
9. Hearings on the Protocol for the Prohibition of  the Use in War of Asphyxiat- 
ing, Poisonous, or Other Gates and of Bacteriological Methods of  Warfare Before the 
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1972) [hereinafter cited 
as Senate Hearings]. 
10. Baxter & Buergenthal, Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, 64 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 853, 856 (1970). 
11. Id. at 857. 
12. Id. 
163 
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French text requires that all gases prohibited have effects similar to 
those of poison and asphyxiating gases, and that therefore tear gas, 
which is much less deleterious than these gases and therefore dis- 
similar, is excluded. Other writers have suggested that the discrepancy 
between "similaires" and "other" is not significant, noting that in 
Article 172 of the Treaty, which requires Germany to inform the Allies 
of "the nature and mode of all explosives, toxic substances or other 
like chemical preparations used by them in the war," it is the English 
version which is more narrow, and the French "azltre preparations 
chemiques" which is broadly prohibitory.lThere are several con- 
clusions which can be drawn from this ambiguity. The first is that 
"[slince both languages are authentic, it would be impossible to say 
which is the correct interpretation."l"nother, perhaps more tenuous, 
is that in light of the fact that both the British and French texts used 
broadly prohibitive language at least once, the prohibition should 
be interpreted broadly, in the absence of any concrete indication 
to the contrary, and in light of the fact that tear gases were used 
heavily in World War I. A third view is that 
the term "similaires" might have been meant to qualify the broad 
prohibition against the use of all gas "in war'' to prohibit only the use 
of gas in any form as a weapon against man . . . but not to prohibit 
other uses of gas "in war" such as the use of helium in barrage 
balloons.l5 
Another argument against a restrictive interpretation of the 
French text is that "the phrase 'gaz toxiques' includes, as a matter of 
French usage, all chemical weapons that are employed for their toxic 
effect on living organisms. I t  thus applies to such irritant chemicals 
as tear gas."16 Yet this reading has been questioned, since "if gaz 
toxiques was meant initially to be an all inclusive category, the specific 
companion prohibitions of gaz asphyxiantes . . . ou similaires ~vould 
seem superfluous." l7 
13. Id. at 858 (emphasis in original). 
14. SU~cOhfhf. ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND ~CIENTIFIC DEVELOPAIENTS 
OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COPIM., CBW: U.S. POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL 
EFFECTS, 9lst Cong,, 1st Sess. 16 (1970) (including an appended study, C. Gellner & 
L. Wu, The Use of Tear Gas in War, id. at 11) Rereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. 
15. Moore, Ratification of the Geneva Protocol on Gas and Bacteriological War- 
fare, 58 VA. L. REV. 419, 455-56 (1972); see discussion on Washington Treaty in 
text accompanying notes 26-28 infra. 
16. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 856 n.16. 
17. Moore, supra note 15, at 455. 
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Another argument against a broad interpretation of the prohibi- 
tion which Article 171 of the Treaty imposes is that that article states 
that the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous or- other gases" is already 
prohibited, and an examination of earlier gas treaties discloses no men- 
tion of tear gas. 
[Tlhe Hague Gas Declaration of 1899 . . . prohibited "the use of . . . 
asphy.uiating or deleterious gases." However, both the British and 
the French believed that this language did not include tear gas. 
[n. In 1913 the British considered that the lachrymatory gas was 
permitted by the wording of the declaration, "although contrary 
to its spirit."] The Versailles "being prohibited" language most likely 
referred to the 1907 Hague Convention rules against "poison or 
poisoned weapons," against killing or wounding "treacherously," 
and against employing war material calculated to cause "unneces- 
sary suffering . . . ." [NJo authority has been found for the proposi- 
tion that [the Hague Convention prohibits] the use of tear gases 
in war. . . . Therefore, [the Treaty of Versailles] probably di$ not 
prohibit tear gases to Germany.ls 
This argument seems weakened by its questionable reliance on the 
British statement regarding lachrymatory gases, and by the heavy use ' 
of tear gas in World War I. Since tear gas was known and used by the 
Allies drafting the treaty, it  seems at least arguable that had the drafters 
meant to exclude tear gas from the new prohibition they were drawing 
up, or felt that it  did not fall within the scope of the Hague Decla- 
rations, they would have said something to this effect. 
B. The Washington Treaty 
The  Treaty on the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases was 
drawn up at the Washington Arms Conference of 1922. At the sug- 
gestion of the American delegation, the provision of the treaty gov- 
erning chemical warfare incorporated the language of the Versailles 
Treaty because of the previous acceptance of that wording by many 
nations. Article Five provided that: 
The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and 
all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly con- 
demned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a pro- 
hibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which a 
majority of the civilized Powers are parties, 
18. Bunn, Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 375, 
398-99 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
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The Signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall 
be universally accepted as a part of international law binding alike 
the conscience and practice of nations, declare their assent to such 
prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between themselves and 
invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.lD 
The( Treaty was ratified by the United States, but failed to come 
into effect because of France's failure to ratify due to objections to 
certain of the provisions governing submarine warfare. A study of 
the travaux preparatoires indicates that the question of inclusion of 
tear gas within the scope of the chemical warfare prohibition was 
discussed; unfortunately, it is not conclusive as to the ultimate dis- 
position of the issue. The technical subcommittee of the Commit- 
tee on Limitation of Armaments declared that "[tlhe kinds of gases 
and their effects on human beings can not be taken as a basis for 
limitation . . . . [Tlhe only limitation practicable is to ~vholly pro- 
hibit the use of gases against cities and other large bodies of non- 
combatants. . . . There could be no limitation on their use against 
the armed forces of the enemy, ashore or afloat."20 Both the Ad- 
visory Committee of the United States Delegation and the General 
Board of the Navy disagreed. Their reports were read into the record 
of the Committee on Limitation of Armaments by Secretary of State 
Hughes, head of the United States delegation. The Advisory Com- 
mittee's report stated that regardless of the experts' opinions, the 
"conscience" of the American public demanded "the total abolition 
of chemical warfare, whether in the Army or the Navy, whether 
against combatant or non~ombatant."~~ Indicating its desire to pro- 
hibit the use of tear gas in warfare, the Advisory Committee stated 
that "there can be no actual restraint of the use by combatants of 
this new agency of warfare, if it is permitted in  any guiseFZ2 Ac- 
cordingly, it introduced a resolution declaring that "chemical war- 
fare, including the use of gases, whether toxic or nontoxic, should 
be prohibited by international agreement . . . .'y23 The General Board 
19. Treaty on the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases, art. 5 (1922), cited in 
Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 858. 
20. CONFERENCE ON THE LI&~ITATION F AR&IAMENT, S. DOC. NO. 126, 67th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 38485 (1922). 
21. Id: at 386. 
22. Id.  at 385 (emphasis added). 
23. HOUSE REPORT 17. 
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of the Navy concurred, suggesting that although the use of tear gas 
might not be strictly outlawed by the rules of war, 
there will be great difF~culty in a clear and definite demarcation 
between the lethal gases and those which produce unnecessary suf- 
fering as distinguished from those gases which simply disable tem- 
porarily. . . . [ q h e  General Board believes it to be sound policy 
to prohibit gas warfare in every form and against every 'objective, 
and so  recommend^?^ 
Secretary Hughes, in suggesting a final version of the provision of 
this treaty banning gas warfare, stated that 
despite the conclusions reached by the [technical subcommittee] . . . 
the American delegation, in the light of the advice of its advisory 
committee . . . and of the specific recommendation of the General 
Board of the Navy, felt that . . . the use of asphyxiating or poison 
gas [should] be absolutely prohibited?" 
It may be questioned, whether the fact that the language of the 
Versailles Treaty was used, rather than words indicating a broad pro- 
hibition of both toxic and nontoxic gases, is significant in view of 
the fact that the United States delegation specifically relied on and 
referred to the reports of the Advisory Committee and the General 
Board of the Navy in its recommendation. Professors R. R. Baxter 
and Thomas Buergenthal suggest that in light of the facts above it 
is "most unlikely that a government which believed that Article 5 
did not outlaw all forms of chemical wadare would have failed to 
state its views to the C~nference."~~ This conclusion is borne out 
by the Senate debate on the scope of the prohibition on gases, .which 
was limited to the question of whether the use of gases such as helium 
and hydrogen for balloons would be prohibited, and did not discuss 
the possible inclusion or exclusion of tear gas.27 
Professor George Bunn, however, suggests that statements made 
by Senator Elihu Root, also a member of the American delegation, 
argues to the contrary: 
Root, who submitted the text to the conference, said it was drafted 
in the language of the Treaty of Versailles . . . because "between 
24. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 859. 
25. Id. at 859-60. 
26. Id.  at 860. 
27. Id. at 858. 
167 
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thirty and forty powers" had already agreed to that language, "so 
that there was not much further to go hi securing . . . general consent 
. . . ." Root understood the Versailles Treaty's "declaration against 
the use of poison gases to be a statement of the previous rules which 
had been adopted during the course of the Hague conferences." 
As we have seen, these probably were never intended to apply to 
tear gases?8 
Again, as in the Treaty of Versailles, the language of the prohibition 
is ambiguous, and the negotiating history is not conclusive. However, 
i t  may be suggested that a strong case can be made for a broad in- 
terpretation of the provision on gas warfare, which would include 
tear gas within its prohibition. 
C. Western Hemisphere Attempts 
Of some significance for the customary international law reach 
of the chemical warfare prohibition may be two actions of Western 
Hemisphere nations indicating their concurrence in the outla~ving 
of chemical warfare. On February 7, 1923, a convention similar to 
that embodied in the Washington Treaty was agreed to by the Cen- 
tral American Republics. Also, in 1923, eighteen American nations, 
including the United States, adopted a recommendation at the Fifth 
International Conference of American States at Santiago that all the 
participating nations "reiterate" the biological and chemical warfare 
prohibition of the Washington Treaty?O However, the precedential 
value of these agreements as evidence of customary international law 
seems arguably slight. The lack of military significance of most of the 
American states, the fact that the Washington Treaty never came 
into effect, and the fact that the action taken at the Santiago con- 
ference was only a recommendation to "reiterate" and not a bind- 
ing agreement, all combine to impart minimal impact to these 1923 
actions. 
D. The  Geneva Protocol 
The records of the Conference for the Supervision of the Inter- 
national Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of 
28. Bunn, supra note 18, at 400; see text accompanying notes 16-18 supra. 
29. O'Brien, Biological/Chemical Warfare and the International Law of War, 51 
GEO. L.J. 1, 25-26 (1962). 
168 
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War, at which the Geneva Protocol was drafted, show no evidence 
of discussion of the possible inclusion or exclusion of tear gas within 
the scope of the Protocol's chemical warfare prohibition. Originally 
it was the aim of the United States to prohibit the exportation from 
the territory of the Contracting Parties of "all asphyxiating, poisonous, 
or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices," 
but this proposal was defeated because many of the chemicals in- 
volved had important peaceful uses, and the practical problems of 
distinguishing between chemicals intended for war use and those 
intended for industrial use ~vould render enforcement diffi~ult.3~ 
Therefore, the United States proposed that the chemical warfare pro- 
hibition adopt the language of the Washington Treaty, which in 
turn embodied the ambiguous language of the Treaty of Versailles. 
In spite of the lack of discussion of tear gas at the Conference 
itself, however, it is significant to note that in the 1926 Senate de- 
bate on ratification of the Geneva Protocol at least some of the Sena- 
tors interpreted the Protocol as prohibiting the use of tear gas in war- 
fare. One of the main objections to ratification voiced was that the 
Geneva Protocol would prohibit the use of tear gas, allegedly a more 
humane method of warfare, and a method which United States do- 
mestic police employed. In a debate between Senators Borah and 
Reed, Senator Reed stated: 
This treaty would stop us from using [tear] gas against the next 
savage race with which we find ourselves in war, and would com- 
pel us to blow them up, or stab them with bayonets, or riddle them 
and sprinkle them with shrapnel, or puncture them with machine- 
gun bullets, instead of blinding them for an hour or so until we 
could disarm them. This is the "humanity" that is attempted to be 
worked out by the Geneva Protoc01.3~ 
Also significant is the fact that Congressman Theodore Burton, the 
United States representative to the Geneva Conference, said that the 
Protocol was "in accordance with our settled policy," and explained 
that policy by reference to the reports of the General Board of the 
Navy and the United States Advisory Committee to the Washington 
Arms Conference, both of which recommended a broad prohibition 
of all chemical gases.32 Similarly, Mr. Philip Noel-Baker, who par- 
30. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 861. 
31. HOUSE REPORT 41. 
32. Moore, supra note 15, at 433-34; see text accompanying notes 19-27 supra. 
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ticipated as a British representative at the Conference, stated in a 
1969 letter to The New York Times: 
What does the Geneva Protocol on Chemical and Biological War- 
fare really mean? Does it allow the use in war of tear gas and 
herbicides? 
When I hear this question, I recall a talk I had in Geneva 
while the Conference of 1925 was going on . . . with a young 
French colleague, Henri Bonnet, later . . . Ambassador to the United 
States. 
"Oh yes," he said, "the form of words they've got is good. I t  
prohibits every kind of chemical or bacterial weapon that anyone 
could possibly devise. And it has to. Perhaps someday a criminal 
lunatic might invent some devilish thing that would destroy animals 
and crops." 
In 1925 everyone in the Conference agreed with Henri Bonnet. 
It was their purpose to ban all C.B. weapons; and they were satis- 
fied that the Protocol would do that."3 
There seemed to be no doubt at the time of the Conference that 
the Geneva Protocol was broadly prohibitory, and that all forms of 
chemical and biological warfare, whether or not known at the time the 
Protocol was drawn up, were to be banned. It was only later, when 
there was a substantial shift in American policy from an active ad- 
vocacy of all disarmament efforts to a policy of "prohibition with 
prepara t i~n,"~~ that any question was raised as to a possible limitation 
on the scope of the Protocol's prohibition. 
A. Preparatory Commission-1930 
In 1930 the Preparatory Commission for the General Disarm- 
ament Conference of the League of Nations met to draft preliminary 
disarmament resolutions. One of the issues discussed was chemical- 
biological warfare, and a draft convention was drawn up based on 
the French version of the Geneva Protocol which outlawed "similaires," 
rather than "other" gases as in the English version. This language 
33. Senate Hearings 263. 
34. F. BROWN, CHEBIICAL WARFARE 109 (1968). 
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prompted the British to state that it was their opinion that tear gas 
was prohibited by the Geneva Protocol, and to request a statement of 
interpretation from other signatory nations.36 France responded: 
All the texts at present in force or proposed in regard to the 
prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar 
gases are identical. In the French delegation's opinion, they apply 
to all gases employed with a view to toxic action on the human 
organism, whether the effects of such action are more or less tem- 
porary irritation of certain mucous membranes or whether they cause 
serious or fatal lesions. . . . 
The French government therefore considers that the use of 
lachrymatory gases is covered by the prohibition arising out of the 
Geneva Protocol.38 
Of the sixteen other nations who were members of the Preparatory 
Commission, ten concurred with the Franco-British interpretation. 
Eight of these nations-Canada, China, Italy, Rumania, Spain, Turkey, 
Yugoslavia, and the USSR-were also at that time parties to the 
Geneva Protocol. Czechoslovakia became a party in  1938, as did 
Japan in 1970, although the Japanese ratification was accompanied, 
by an informal understanding that tear gas was not prohibited by the 
Protocol. The six other members of the Preparatory Commission who 
were also parties to the Geneva Protocol did not respond.37 The United 
States was the only member of the Preparatory Commission which 
expressly objected to the British and French interpretation of the 
Geneva Protocol, although because the United States was not a party 
to the Protocol its spokesman, Hugh Gibson, couched his objections 
in terms of the parameters that a future chemical warfare prohibition 
should take on. He stated: 
I think there would be considerable hesitation on the part of 
many Governments to bind themselves to refrain .from the use in 
war, against an enemy, of agencies which they have adopted for 
peace-time use against their own populations, agencies adopted on the 
ground that, while causing temporary inconvenience, they cause no 
real suffering or permanent disability, and are thereby more clearly 
humane than the use of weapons to which they were formerly ob- 
liged to resort to in times of emergency.38 
35. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 863. 
36. Moore, supra note 15, at 460-61. ' 
37. Id. at 461. 
38. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 863. 
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This line of reasoning, first voiced in the 1926 Senate debate on the 
Protocol, has been the continuing basis of the United States' refusal to 
ratify the Protocol. Because of this divergence of opinion, the Prepara- 
tory Commission announced in 1931 that "it was unable to express 
a definite opinion on this question of inter~retation."~~ 
B. The League Disarmament Conference-1932-33 
The language of the Geneva Protocol was not discussed at the 
subsequent Disarmament Conference. However, the wording of the 
resolution proposed by the Special Committee on Chemical-Biological 
Warfare, and accepted by the United States, suggests a settled view that 
the use of tear gas in war should be prohibited. The ban outla~ved 
all natural or synthetic noxious substances, whatever their state, 
whether solid, liquid or gaseous, whether toxic, lachrymatory, ir- 
ritant, vesicant, or capable in any way of producing harmful effects 
on the human or animal organism, whatever the method of their 
use . . . .40 
There were several reasons advanced for the inclusion of tear gas 
within this broad prohibition. The most important was that the term 
"lachrymatory substances" does not define a chemical group, but 
refers instead to the physiological effects of certain chemicals, and that 
serious, even lethal, injuries could result if gases normally only irri- 
tating were used in sufficiently concentrated form. In addition, it was 
noted that some lachrymatory substances had multiple uses. Thus 
benzyl bromide, used by French police as an irritant agent, was also 
the chemical most often employed for charging asphyxiating shells 
during World War I.41 It was also "feared that, if the use of lachryma- 
tory substances were permitted, those used in war would not be the 
harmless substances employed in most countries for police purposes, 
but highly poisonous gases."42 Further, it was thought that even if 
mildly irritating lachrymatory gases were used, they might lead to the 
use of sternutatory (sneeze-inducing) gases against which more elabo- 
39. Department of State Report of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarma- 
ment Conference 45 (1931), cited in Moore, supra note 15, at 461. 
40. HOUSE REPORT 19. 
41. 4 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PE CE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, TIIE PRODLE~I 
OF CHE~~ICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 154 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SIPRI]. 
42. Id. 
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rate protective devices would be requiredP3 The rationale underlying 
all these objections was that since a clear-cut definition of lachrymatory 
agents could not be put forth, to establish a limited exception for 
these substances would create possibilities for abuse, an invitation to 
escalation, and would weaken the whole structure of di~armament.~~ 
Yet in spite of the breadth of this chemical warfare prohibition, 
and the significance of the United States' acceptance of it, it is impor- 
tant to remember that no general disarmament agreement ever came 
into effect. This was due to a number of factors, the most significant 
being the German withdrawal from the League of Nations and sub- 
sequent rearmament, and the generally increasing impotency of the 
League. In addition, one commentator has suggested that the wide- 
spread revulsion to chemical warfare after World War I, which was 
capitalized upon by pacifist publicists, resulted in an overestimation 
of the importance to national security of chemical weaponry.45 Because 
of this misconception, shared by the public at large and high govern- 
ment officials of all nations, the question of chemical-biological dis- 
armament became much more difficult. 
In a situation where CB weapons were regarded as of rather doubt- 
ful military value, a less than perfect disarmament scheme might 
have been acceptable; but in the present context this would not 
do. The conference debate about the difficulties of verifying the ob- 
servance of chemical disarmament agreements, which reverted again 
and again to the question of convertibility [of peacetime chemical 
industries to military use] without ever resolving it, has left its mark 
on all subsequent discussions of the problem.46 
Since no final disarmament agreement ever came into force, the ques- 
tion arises as to the weight which should be accorded the Disarmament 
Conference resolution in interpreting the Geneva Protocol. One recent 
source stresses the importance of the notice aspect of the Preparatory 
Commission and the Disarmament C~nference .~~ Its authors conclude 
that because no then-party to the Geneva Protocol entered an objec- 
tion to the Franco-British interpretation in 1930, and no party which 
has subsequently become a party has entered a reservation excluding 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 19-20. 
' 45. 1 id. 51-54. 
46. Id. at 254. 
47. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 864. 
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tear gas from the Protocols' scope, its prohibition of tear gas 
must be considered to be extremely clear. The fact that Japan felt 
it necessary to ratify the Protocol with an informal understanding that 
'it did not include tear gas supports this position. On the other hand, 
"tvhile the intent to include tear gas in the prohibition on gases in the 
Disarmament Convention was unmistakable, it is often stressed that 
these negotiations were not attempting to interpret the Geneva Pro- 
tocol, but rather, were seeking a new and separate disarmament agree- 
ment,"48 and that therefore the Disarmament Convention has no 
evidentiary value for the Protocol. 
C. The Late 1930's 
In the late 193OYs, allegations were made of the use of poisonous 
and tear gases in three conflicts: by the Italians against Ethiopia in 
1935 and 1936,49 by both sides in the Spanish Civil War in 1936 and 
1937,60 and by Japan against China in 1938-1941.G1 The allegations were 
substantiated in the first and last instances, while no conclusive evi- 
dence exists as to the Spanish Civil War. The Japanese freely admitted 
the use of irritant gases, but stated that they did not consider the use 
of such gases to be contrary to international law because they did 
not cause death or permanent injury.62 The League of Nations failed to 
move effectively against Italy and Japan. Although some economic 
sanctions were applied against Italy they were inadequate and came 
too late, and by the time allegations of Japanese aggression against 
China were made the international situation had so far deteriorated 
that it was "impossible for the League to give even moral assistance 
to Chi11a."6~ 
D. World War II 
The precedent set by the ineffective response of the League of 
Nations to the use of chemical weapons by Italy seemed ominous. In 
.April, 1936, the British Prime Minister queried: 
48. HOUSE REPORT 20. 
49. 4 SIPRI 175-89. 
50. 1 id. 258-59. 
51. 4 id. 189-91; Kelly, Gas Warfare in International Law, 9 MIL. L. REV. 1, 13 
(19651. 
52. 1 SIPRI 148. 
53. 4 id. 191. 
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If these allegations of the use of poison gas be true-and I have 
every reason to believe that they are true-the peril I see to the 
world is this: if a great European nation, in spite of having given 
its signature to the Geneva protocol against the use of such gases, 
employs them in Africa, what guarantee have we that they may 
not be used in Europe?64 
Thus, it is somewhat surprising that during World War I1 there was 
complete abstention from the use of chemical weaponry including 
tear gas. There have been a number of reasons advanced for this, pri- 
mary among them being the fear of reprisal. Hitler and Roosevelt 
had a strong personal aversion to the use of gas in military combat, the 
former because he had been gassed during World War I, and there were 
many military men in all nations who did not understand chemical 
warfare and were generally distrustful of it. The active publicity cam-. 
paign mounted by pacifist groups during the interwar period had 
greatly exaggerated the destructive potential of chemical warfare; this 
~llisconception was compounded by a generous overestimation by all bel- 
ligerents of the quality and quantity of their enemies' chemical warfare 
stockpiles. Finally, there were only a limited number of situations in 
which the use of chemical weapons would have provided a decisive mili- 
tary advantage; these were more than counterbalanced by the uncer- 
tainty of retaliation, and the fear that "a chemical mortar action in 
some distant combat theatre, even with irritant-agent projectiles, might 
be met by the gas bombing of a capital The legal constraints 
against use of chemical warfare were generally quite irrelevant to the 
decision made not to use gas, because of the overriding practical con- 
straints of "lack of military interest . . . fear of retaliation and lack of 
material capability."56 But the legal constraints were significant "be- 
cause of their influence in retarding acceptance of gas as a standard 
weapon of war, and hence in their contribution to the belligerents' 
overall unpreparedness to wage CW, and their leaders' unwillingness to 
authorize it." 57 
Thus, when the war broke out, Britain, France, Germany, and 
Italy all pledged to observe the Geneva Protocol; Japan responded 
ambiguously. A State Department suggestion that the United States 
advise Japan that we ~vould adhere to the terms of the Geneva Protocol 
54. London Times, Apr. 20, 1936, at 8, col. 2. 
55. 1 SIPRI 335. 
56.  Id. at 321. 
57. Id. at 322. 
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on the basis of reciprocity was rejected in February, 1942, by Secretary 
of War Stimson because of his concern over our lack of preparedness 
to retaliate if Japan used gas .rvarfare.GS However, in June, 1942, Pres- 
ident Roosevelt, responding to pressure from the Chinese, stated that 
we would retaliate heavily against Japan if she continued to use gas 
against China or any other American ally, and in June, 1943, issued the 
following statement in response to rumors of imminent German use 
of gas: 
From time to time since the present war began there have 
been reports that one or more of the Axis powers were seriously 
contemplating use of poisonous or noxious gases or other inhumane 
device of warfare. 
Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion 
of civilized mankind. This country has not used them, and I hope 
that we never will be compelled to use them. I state categorically 
that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such 
weapons unless they are first used by our enemies. 
[Alcts of this nature committed against any one of the United 
Nations [the Allies] will be regarded as having been committed 
againstl the United States itself and will be treated accordingly. 
We promise to any perpetrators of such crimes full and swift re- 
taliation in kind.69 
In neither his 1942 nor his 1943 declaration did Roosevelt refer to the 
Geneva Protocol. 
Toward the end of the Pacific war the use of poison gas was urged 
by some members of the military as a way to reduce American casual- 
ties in the island campaigns. However, Admiral Nimitz decided that 
"the United States should not be the first to violate the Geneva Con- 
~ e n t i o n . " ~ ~  Similarly, a memo concerning the possible use of herbicides 
prepared by General Myron Cramer, the Judge Advocate General of 
the Army, for the Secretary of War stated: 
The United States is not bound by any treaty which specifically 
excludes or restricts the use of chemicals, whether toxic or non- 
toxic in time of war. . . . An exhaustive study of the source 
materials, however, warrants the conclusion that a customary rule 
58. Bunn, supra note 18, at 382. 
59. 8 DEP'T STATE BULL. 507 (1943) (emphasis added). 
60. Moore, supra note 15, at 436. 
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of international law had developed by which poisonous gases and . 
those cawing unnecessary suferings are prohibited . . . . The United 
States has officially announced that it will observe this prin- 
ciple . . . 
Both these statements indicate an implicit recognition of the major 
disadvantages of a change in the only recently declared United States 
policy of no first use of chemical weapons. "To reverse this within so 
short a time would not be in keeping with U.S. aspirations for moral 
leadership of the world in the coming post-war years."62 
E. The Korean War and Beyond 
During the Korean War the United States used tear and vomiting 
gases to suppress rioting prisoners of war, apparently on the theory 
that this was not a use in war but Tvas analogous to domestic riot con- 
t r ~ l . ~ ~  Allegations were made by China and North Korea that the 
United States was using germ warfare, but a United States denial and 
suggestion that an international investigatory commission be set up  
was rejected. One commentator has speculated that "[allthough not 
decisive, our failure to use gas in Korea and our defense against the 
germ warfare charge are evidence that we believed the use of poison 
gas and germ warfare to be wrong."a4 
After the Korean War a perceptible alteration in State and 
Defense Department attitudes toward chemical warfare became evi- 
dent: "U.S. military authorities were beginning to move away from 
the doctrine of massive retaliation to one of flexible response, and a 
case [~vas] made that, in the absence of a first-use prohibition, CB 
weapons were suited to this new do~ t r ine . "~~  Responding to this change, 
Congressman Robert Kastenmeir introduced a resolution which af- 
firmed "the longstanding policy of the United States that in the event 
of war the United States shall under no circumstances resort to the use 
of biological weapons or the use of poisonous or noxious gases unless 
61. 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1300, 1305 (M. Righini ed. 1971) (emphasis in 
original). The memo goes on to suggest that herbicides are not within the scope of the 
prohibition. 
62. 1 SIPRI 331. 
63. HOUSE REPORT 27. 
64. Bunn, supra note 18, at 383. 
65. 5 SIPRI 127. 
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they are first used by our enemies."06 In January, 1960, President 
Eisenhower was questioned about a possible policy change; his reply 
was that "no such official suggestion has been made to me and so far 
as my own instinct is concerned, is to not start such a thing as that 
first."07 However, both the State and Defense Departments lobbied 
heavily against the Kastenmeir resolution enunciating the necessity 
of retaining presidential discretion. The Chemical Corps, formerly the 
Chemical Warfare Services, launched an active publicity campaign to 
increase public acceptance of chemical weaponry, and in Congressional 
testimony painted a picture of "war without death" by showing, inter 
alia, a film of a cat which had been given LSD cowering in front of a 
mouse. The result was a five-fold increase in the Chemical Corps 
budget and a greatly enlarged stockpile of nerve gases and biological 
~veapons.~~ The tone and intensity of the debate suggested that the 
concern of the State and Defense Departments was focused on the 
"propriety of using chemical and biological weapons generally rather 
than the wisdom of imposing less restrictive controls on the use of 
riot-control or anti-plant agents." 0D 
F. Vietnam 
That the United States was considering a major change in its 
chemical warfare policy was borne out by its practice in Vietnam. 
Between 1964 and 1969, 13.7 million pounds of tear gas were used by 
United States forces there.70 While North Vietnam and the Viet Cong 
a1';;';sed tear gas, they did not initiate its use. The three principal 
types of "riot-control" agents used by the United States were DM 
(adamsite) , CN (chloroacetophenone) , and CS (orthochlorobenzal- 
malononitrile). The use of DM, a vomiting gas, by United States 
forces was apparently eliminated sbmetime in the late 1960's. CN is 
the major type of tear gas used by United States domestic police, while 
CS, which is simultaneously the most irritating and the least toxic, 
was the "riot-control agent" most used in Vietnam. CS-1 and CS-2 are 
forms of CS which are made more persistent by coating particles of 
66. Decker & Dunlap, War, Genetics and the Law, 1 ECOLOOY L.Q. 795, 813 
(1971). 
67. Moore, supra note 15, at 439. 
68. 5 SIPRI 127-28. 
69. Moore, supra note 15, at 439. 
70. Senate Hearings 13. 
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CS with silicone so that they are able to produce irritating fumes for 
as long as forty-five days after the initial spraying. 
The original justification for the use of tear gas in Vietnam was 
that it ~vould save the lives of innocent civilians who were being used 
by enemy soldiers as human shields; by rendering the enemy and 
civilians helpless, tear gas would enable the enemy to be captured and 
the civilians to be set In practice, however, 
[a]s the effectiveness of these riot-control agents in reducing casual- 
ties became increasingly evident in such situations as suppression 
of hostile firepower and clearance of fortified positions and under- . . '  
ground facilities, American commanders at all levels began to see 
other ways in which the use of the riot-control agents, particularly . ' 
the new agent CS, could save many American and allied lives. As a 
result, its applicability to [normal combat] operations spread among 
U.S. units in Vietnam.72 
A twofold shift in emphasis became apparent: an increasing con,- 
cern for the lives of American and South Vietnamese troops as opposed 
to those of innocent civilians or the Viet Cong, and an acceptance of 
the use of tear gas for purposes disconsonant with the notion of humane 
weaponry. 
[Llarge numbers of tear gas grenades [were] dropped on Viet Cong . 
strongholds from helicopters which were followed by B-52's dropping . , 
high-explosive or anti-personnel-fragmentation bombs. The purpose . . . 
of such an attack would appear to be to flush out those hiding - 
, . in tunnels, to incapacitate them with gas, and then to wound or , 
kill them with bombs. This seems wholly inconsistent with the hu-' 
manitarian justification given by the United  state^?^ 
Another aspect of the United States' use of "riot-control agents9' in 
Vietnam was that while tear gas does not ordinarily have my' del- 
eterious effects, the generally poor health of the Vietnamese pe?pl( 
especially the young, old, and pregnant, made them much more 
susceptible to negative, and even fatal, effects from .tear gas. Reports 
from a Canadian doctor and others in Vietnam indicate that a number 
of children and adults were killed by tear gas attacks on the cave or  
71. Statement of J. Nabrit, United States Deputy Representative to the Ujted 
Nations, HOUSE REPORT 22. 
72. Statement of Rear Admiral William E. Lemos, Hearings Before the.,:Sub- 
comm. on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Fore&n 
Affairs Comm., cited in Senate Hearings 54 (emphasis added). 
73. Bunn, supra note 18, at 405-06. 
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bunke; in which they were hiding. Those that were not killed de- 
veloped a "chronic bronchitic [condition] complicated by  infection^."^^ 
"[Rlepeated respiratory disease as a complication of parasitosis is very 
common in Vietnamese children," and tuberculosis is "a common 
disease among peasants in Asia."?G Since both these conditions are 
easily aggravated by exposure to any irritating gas, it appears likely 
that a concentration of tear gas even moderately higher than normal 
could cause serious injury or death. Thus, weaponry which was 
humane for domestic police enforcement became significantly less 
humane in a combat situation.T6 
G. Other Developments Since 1960 
From 1963 to 1967 a number of allegations were made of Egyp- 
tian chemical warfare attacks on Royalist villages in the Yemini Civil 
War. Only three of the allegations are well substantiated, but these 
three indicate that tear gases were used first in 1963, and that later, in 
1967, mustard gas and phosgene were used. The United Nations did 
not take any action on these allegations, other than attempting to 
verify them. One explanation put forward for this inaction was that 
no nation was willing to push publicly for sanctions, that the conflict 
was inter-Arab, and that by the time well-documented allegations were 
received, promising negotiations were underway between the United 
Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia, who were the backers of the rival 
Yemini factions.77 
In February, 1970, Great Britain announced a change in its prev- 
iously broad interpretation of the chemical warfare prohibition of the 
Geneva Protocol. Its new position is "that although the British govern- 
ment [has] not changed its position that tear gases are prohibited by 
the [Geneva] Protocol, it [does] not interpret this ban as extending 
to CS-the principal tear gas relied on . . . by Great Britain in 
Northern Ireland."78 Great Britain explained this apparent incon- 
sistency by noting that CS is "not significantly harmful to man in other 
74. 1 SIPRI 206. 
: 75. Id. at 207. 
76. For a general survey of United States practice in Vietnam, see Senate Hearing 
12-15, 54-55> 270-73; HOUSE REPORT 3-5, 28-32; Bunn, supra note 18, at 394, 405- 
06; Moore, supra note 15, 439-41 
77. 1 SIPRI 159-61; 4 id. at 243-47; 5 id. at 225-38. 
78. Moore, supra note 15, at 464. 
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than wholly exceptional circumstances . . . . CS is in fact less toxic than 
the screening smokes which the 1930 statement specifically excluded."70 
Although the British position is not wholly logical, it seems distinguish- 
able from that of the United States because Britain's use of CS is 
still confined to traditional riot-control situations, while United States 
use in Vietnam extended to full-scale warfare. 
As noted above, when Japan acceded to the Geneva Protocol in 
1970, it did so under an informal understanding that the Protocol 
did not prohibit tear gas. According to recent testimony before the 
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Develop- 
ments, "no state party to the [Geneva] [Plrotocol has officially objected 
to the Japanese interpretation of that instrument." 
H. United Nations Action 
Responding to the United States' use of tear gas and herbicides in 
Vietnam, the United Nations General Assembly, beginning in 1966, 
passed a series of resolutions condemning the use of gas in warfare. 
On November 7, 1966, Hungary introduced a resolution demanding 
strict compliance by all nations with the terms of the Geneva Protocol, 
stressing that it had become binding international law through the 
customary adherence of nations to its principles, and that the United 
States had violated this rule of customary international law by its 
practice in Vietnam.81 The United States responded that neither the 
Geneva Protocol nor any subsequent rule of customary international 
law prohibited the use of tear gas in warfare. Echoing the 1926 debate 
on ratification of the Protocol, the United States Deputy Represent- 
ative to the United Nations stated: 
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 . . . was framed to meet the horrors 
of poison gas warfare in the first World War and was intended to 
reduce suffering by prohibiting the use of poisonous gases such .as 
mustard gas and phosgene. I t  does not apply to all gases. I t  would 
be unreasonable to contend that any rule of international law pro- 
hibits the use in combat against an enemy, for humanitarian pur- 
poses, of agents that Governments around the world commonly 
use to control riots by their own people.82 I 
79. Id. at 46465. 
80. House Hearings 192. 
81. HOUSE REPORT 21. 
82. Moore, supra note 15, at 444-45. 
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Because of an inability to agree on the scope of either the Geneva 
Protocol or the customary international law prohibition, an amended 
resolution, for which the United States voted, was drafted. 
[It] merely "calls for strict observance by all States of the principles 
and objectives of the Geneva Protocol . . . and condemns all actions 
contrary to those objectives," and invites all States which have not 
done so to accede to the Protocol. No reference is made which 
might be construed as an interpretation of the wording of the pro- 
tocol, particularly with regard to tear gas and  herbicide^.^^ 
In 1967, Malta suggested in a resolution to the First Committee of 
the United Nations that the language of the Geneva Protocol be 
revised because of technical developments which now made the lang- 
uage of the Protocol exclude some seriously deleterious agents (such 
as psychochemicals, which are neither "gaseous" nor "liquid" and 
can have effects neither "asphyxiating" or "poisonous"), while in- 
cluding less harmless chemicals "because their basic characteristics and 
effects were included in the language of the ban."s4 The USSR 
opposed this resolution because it felt that to change the Geneva 
Protocol would eliminate its status as "a universally acknowledged 
norm of contemporary international law binding on all po~ers,"~G 
and supported a new broadly prohibitive Hungarian resolution. Be- 
cause of inability to negotiate a compromise resolution, both the 
Maltese and Hungarian resolutions were dropped. 
A December, 1968 United Nations resolution set up a scientific 
study group to determine the nature and effects of chemical-biological 
weaponry and to prepare a report giving their findings. While dealing 
mainly with chemical and biological agents other than tear gas, and 
concluding that the likelihood of the latter's having lethal effects was 
extremely small, the report did suggest that 
even though these substances may be less toxic than most other 
chemical agents, their ill-considered use, or use for military purposes 
could turn out to be highly dangerous . . . . Once any chemical or 
bacteriological (biological) weapon had been used in warfare, there 
would be a serious risk of escalation, both in the use of more dan- 
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gerous weapons belonging to the same class and of other weapons 
of mass destructi~n.~~ 
In November, 1969, Sweden introduced a resolution which stated 
that "the Geneva Protocol embodies the generally recognized rules of 
international law prohibiting the use in international armed conflicts 
of all biological and chemical methods of warfare, regardless of any 
technical developments,"8* and that the prohibition of the Geneva 
Protocol included "any chemical agents of warfare . . . which might be 
employed because of their direct toxic effect on man, animals, or 
plants." The latter language was clearly intended to include tear gas.88 
There have been varying interpretations given to the vote on this 
resolution, which was 80 in favor, 36 abstentions, and 3 agdinst (the 
United States, Portugal, and Australia) . Many of the abstentions were 
on the ground that the United Nations General Assembly was an 
inappropriate forum for treaty interpretation, and that such interpre- 
tation should be left to the parties of the treaty. This was the position 
of many abstaining NATO nations who were signatories of the Pro- 
tocol, and also of the United s t a t e ~ . ~ ~  It is likely that one reason for 
the high number of abstentions among NATO nations was a desire 
not to offend the United States regardless of their actual beliefs con- 
cerning the scope of the Protocol. Different sources have used the 
statistics of the voting on this resolution to support somewhat dif- 
ferent conclusions. Gellner and Wu state that "more than one-third 
of the parties and signatories to the protocol neither favored nor op- 
posed the protocol. These facts could prevent the resolution from 
being an undisputed legal interpretation of the Geneva Protocol."9o ' 
Baxter and Buergenthal, on the other hand, emphasize that 
[allthough the vote cannot be regarded as a resounding affirmation 
of the proposition that irritant chemicals fall under the prohibition 
of the Protocol, the large number of states voting in favor of the 
resolution indicates that there is a very substantial amount of sup- 
port for that view. 
These few dissenting voices and thirty-six states whose silence 
86. Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects o f  Their 
Possible Use (1968), cited in HOUSE REPORT 23. 
87. G.A. Res. 2603, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969). 
88. HOUSE REPORT 24. 
89. Id.  at 25. 
90. Id. 
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supports neither one construction nor the other do not evidence any 
strong enthusiasm for a restrictive interpretation of the Protoc01.~' 
The ongoing negotiations at the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament, the Convention for the Prohibition of Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons 
(which requires ratification by the United States to enter into effect), 
and the recent appropriations request by the Pentagon for production 
of binary nerve gases all point to the urgency of United States rati- 
fication of the Geneva Protocol as the basic document prohibiting 
chemical and biological warfare. What continues to divide the Admin- 
istration and the Senate and prevent Senate advice and consent to 
ratification is the question of the inclusion of tear gas and herbicides 
within the scope of the Protocol's prohibition. As has been shown 
above, the negotiating history of'the Protocol, and of the Washington 
and Versailles treaties which preceded it, is not conclusive on the 
issue of tear gas although there is strong evidence supporting an inter- 
pretation of the Protocol that is broadly prohibitive. In addition, the 
subsequent statements and practice of nations, with the exception of 
the United States, evidence nearly unanimous concurrence in the view 
that the use of tear gas in war is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol. 
Given, then, an ambiguous negotiating history and a current climate 
of world opinion which, with the exception of Japan and Britain, is 
strongly in favor of a total ban on the use of gas in warfare, what are 
the present options of the.United States? 
One option is to ratify the Protocol with the single reservation 
and the informal understanding proposed by the Administration. The 
proposed reservation states: "That the said Protocol shall cease to be 
binding on the Government of the United States with respect to the 
use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all 
analogous liquids, materials, or devices, in regard to an enemy State 
if such State or any of its allies fails to respect the prohibitions laid 
down in the Protocol.'y92 Its effect is to turn the Prohibition into a 
"no-first-use" prohibition in regard to chemical warfare, and is similar 
91. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 865-66. 
92. 63 DEP'T STATE BULL. 274 (1970). 
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in this respect to reservations made by almost every other signatory 
nation. It is, however, dissimilar to reservations made by most nations 
in that it does not limit the obligations of the United States to other 
parties to the Protocol, and in that it renounces absolutely the use in 
war of biological and toxin weapons. 
The understanding to which the Administration would like the 
Senate to agree is that the Protocol "does not prohibit the use in war 
of riot-control agents and chemical  herbicide^."^^ The problem with 
this "understanding" is that it offers only meretricious advantages and 
provides no real legal protection to the United States or any addition 
to its national security. Because the "understanding" is only a "whisper 
in the ear of the Senate" and is not to be formally deposited with the 
ratification, 
[tlhe danger . . . is that if one state such as the United States . . . 
where to say that tear gas is permissible and were to use it, the 
other side would then say that there has been a clear violation of 
the Geneva protocol [because it prohibits the use of all gas in war], 
will feel liberated from the obligations of the protocol, and will 
consider itself entitled to resort to any sort of gas or herbicide that 
it may think proper to employ . . . .94 [I]f the matter were ever to 
be litigated or discussed in any forum which could reach a decision 
on the question, the U.S. pronouncement would be simply "one 
man's opinion" and would carry no international legal effect.95 
There is some disagreement on this point. Another international 
lawyer has suggested that 
[gliven the ambiguities in the text of the protocol, the statement 
would most likely be accepted as an interpretation of an ambiguous 
provision, rather than a reservation [going to the heart of the 
protocol, which it clearly is not] . . . . Thus we would become a 
party to the Protocol with a clear understanding on tear gas and 
herbicides as far as most parties were con~erned .~~  
A second alternative is to ratify the Geneva Protocol with an 
explicit reservation of the right to use tear gas and herbicides in 
war. This has the advantage of making clear our position, and allo~ving 
the exact definition of the legal relations between the United States 
93. Id. 
94. House Hearings 107. 
95. Id. at 128. 
96. Bunn, supra note 18, at 411. 
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and other parties to the Protocol. The law governing treaties and 
reservations thereto being "very much like the law of offer and 
counteroffer," any nation that did not voice objection to the reserva- 
tion would be presumed to have accepted it.97 If a country did object 
to the United States' reservation, something which has not happened 
with any other reservation made to the Protocol, then two results are 
possible: Either the particular provision affected by the reservation 
~vould not enter into force between the objecting and the reserving 
state, or the treaty as a whole would not come into effect.08 The latter 
seems much more likely because the Geneva Protocol 
is so short and so highly integrated an instrument that: it is very 
difficult to think of segregating out the provision which is affected 
by a reservation and saying that this will not be in force but that 
all the rest of the protocol will be. The reservation actually goes 
to the very guts of the obligation-the type of chemical agents which 
are covered by the protocol.99 
Even if the United States' reservation were accepted, there ~vould be 
the problem of definition, of specifying exactly what is a riot-control or 
lachrymatory agent or a chemical herbicide. As noted above in the 
discussion of the 1932 Disarmament Conference, it is very difficult to 
determine which chemicals fall within the lachrymatory category and 
there is always the risk that, intentionally or otherwise, a newly de- 
veloped chemical weapon would be labeled a riot-control agent when 
in fact its effects were much more deleterious and long-lasting. If this 
were to occur, the Protocol would be effectively scuttled. That is why 
it has always been felt so important-whether today, at the 1932 Dis- 
armament Conference, and at least arguably, at the time of the draft- 
ing of the Geneva Protocol itself-that the prohibition on chemical 
warfare be absolute. 
On the other hand, ratification with a formal reservation has two 
advantages over ratification with an undeposited "understanding." 
Even if a number of important states objected to the United States' 
ratification of the Geneva Protocol with such a reservation thereby 
preventing the Protocol from coming into effect between the United 
States and the objecting nation, the United States would know exactly 
where it stood legally, and would have the opportunity to reconsider 
.--.. - 
97. House Hearings 127. 
98. Id. 
99. Id.  
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in the face of such a strong and unequivocal statement of world 
opinion the importance, militarily and politically, of retaining the 
right to first use of tear gas and herbicides. It then might decide to 
ratify without reservation. 
The third option open to the United States is to ratify the Protocol 
with only the limited "no-first-use" reservation proposed by former 
Secretary of State Rogers, without any "understanding" of a limitation 
on the scope of the Protocol. The advantages to this approach are 
several. Ratification in this manner would make the legal position of 
the United States very clear, and leave no possibility of difficult ques- 
tions of interpretation arising in times of conflict. But most important, 
ratification without reservation as to the scope of the prohibition 
would help ensure the fulfillment of the basic purpose of the Protocol 
-the outlawing of all forms of chemical and biological warfare. Rati- 
fication without reservation ~vould certainly produce a favorabIe 
world reaction. Furthermore, it ~vould establish the momentum 
needed for the ratification of the Convention for the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and 
Toxin Weapons, and for substantial progress at the Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament. 
LINDA C. FENTIMAN 
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